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Abstract
In a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary trans-
fers, I establish the Veto-Power Principle: any incentive-compatible outcome
can be implemented through veto-based delegation with an endogenously cho-
sen default decision. This result demonstrates the exact nature of commitment
powers required by the principal: (1) to design the default outcome and (2) to
ensure that she has almost no formal control over the agent’s decisions.
JEL codes: D78, D82, L22, M54.
Keywords: veto power, asymmetric information, principal-agent relationship, no mon-
etary transfers.
1 Introduction
Decision making in real life frequently incorporates elements of veto-based delegation:
an agent has the right to propose a decision, while a principal has the right to veto
it. The US Congress, for example, has been using legislative veto, expedited congres-
sional oversight, and other provisions that allow for disapproval of decisions delegated
to executive agencies. The British parliament employs two procedures, affirmative
and negative, for the review of delegated legislation. Under affirmative procedure
a legislation has to be explicitly approved by the parliament, whereas under nega-
tive procedure a legislation becomes a law unless it is explicitly disapproved within
40 days. On some issues the European Union legislature (the Parliament and the
Council) subject the decisions of the executive (the European Commission) to the
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approval of regulatory committees. In US open corporations the proposals by the
board of directors about its new members, auditor choice, mergers, and new stock
issues have to be approved by shareholders. In turn, the boards ratify major pol-
icy initiatives, and approve decisions on hiring, firing, and amount of compensation
for important decision managers. The creditors of a corporation are often provided
with guarantees that incurring other debt, making substantial capital acquisitions,
increasing dividends, and changing the executive officers cannot be made without
their consent.
These examples have several common attributes: (1) one party (an agent, he)
has superior decision-relevant information and has the right and the responsibility to
initiate decisions, while (2) the other party (a principal, she) has the right to reject the
decision but typically does not have a formal right, is unqualified, constrained by time,
or has to incur a high opportunity cost to develop a counter proposal. Furthermore,
there are no payments between the parties that are directly tailored to the proposed
decisions.
Although sometimes these elements of veto-based delegation are exogenously given
(e.g., referendum, ratification of a treaty), they frequently appear to be a result of
conscious design (e.g., during the Great Depression the legislative veto emerged as an
innovative form of legislation tool purporting to overcome delays associated with the
standard legislative process).1 In such situations, the principal may be also capable
of choosing a default decision, which is implemented in the absence of approval (e.g.,
Appropriation Acts of the US Congress usually specify the purposes and the amounts
for these purposes that do not require further approval).2
In this paper I analyze the performance of veto-based delegation in the principal-
agent environment with hidden information and no monetary transfers. I demonstrate
that under some regularity condition any feasible outcome, and hence any desired
outcome, can be implemented through veto-based delegation with a properly chosen
default decision.
This result is a generalization of a simple observation. Consider a cheap-talk
communication game (Crawford and Sobel [3]). In this game, any equilibrium has a
partition structure and each element of this partition leads to a distinct choice. On
the equilibrium path, the sender (the agent) chooses from among these different alter-
natives by sending a corresponding message; if the sender uses an out-of-equilibrium
message, the receiver (the principal) takes a certain decision, say a, regardless of what
the sender’s private information might have been. One can rewrite this equilibrium
as an outcome of veto-based delegation as follows: The agent proposes a decision. If
1See Fisher [6] for discussion of the origins and history of the legislative veto.
2For instance, in Department of Homeland Security Appropriation Act 2006, H.R.2360, USD M
340 is appropriated for the development of Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, of
which USD M 160 may not be used until the Committees on Appropriations receive and approve a
plan for expenditure, whereas none of USD M 456 appropriated for customs and border protection
automated systems may be spent without approval of the Committees. Similarly, provisions deter-
mining what should and what should not be approved are contained in sections dealing with Air and
Marine Operations, Customs Enforcement Automated Systems, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
and General Provisions.
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this decision could have been induced through some message in the original game,
the principal approves it. Otherwise, she vetoes it using action a.
Extending this argument to arbitrary incentive-compatible outcomes (Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 and Corollary 4) is essentially equivalent to characterizing the conditions
under which there exists an appropriate default decision. The potential difficulty is
that either the default decision will not pose a sufficient threat for the agent or that
for some proposals the principal will find the default decision more attractive and will
therefore veto the decisions that should have been approved.3 Proposition 3 shows
that the natural choice of the default decision is the most extreme decision that would
be implemented on the equilibrium path: in this case the principal finds it optimal to
approve every proposal expected on the equilibrium path and veto everything else.
In a more specialized environment, Lemma 1 characterizes the set of incentive-
efficient outcomes. These outcomes can be implemented through veto-based delega-
tion. Corollary 5 then shows that a smaller conflict of preferences between the agent
and the principal results in a more extreme default decision for which veto-based
delegation implements these efficient outcomes.
I also study which other mechanisms with imperfect commitment can implement
efficient outcomes in this environment. Proposition 5 reveals that an efficient outcome
can be implemented through a mechanism with imperfect commitment only if in this
mechanism the principal has almost no ex-post discretion over the agent’s decisions:
the set of decisions that she can take after disapproving the agent’s proposal should
contain at most one, the most extreme, decision from the set of decisions that should
be implemented on the equilibrium path. If the principal can take more than one
such decision, she would excessively overrule the agent’s proposals to correct for the
conflict of preferences ex-post, which will negatively affect the agent’s incentives and
decrease ex-ante payoffs of both parties.
The analysis in this paper complements the results in Gilligan and Krehbiel [7],
Krishna and Morgan [10], and Martin [12] that veto-based delegation (with a fixed
default decision) may be superior to other forms of legislative rules and the result
in Dessein [4] that full delegation is often superior to communication. This paper
further extends this literature by showing that if the principal can select a default
decision, veto-based delegation need not be inferior to any other decision making
arrangement. This finding also clarifies the reasons for the conflicting conclusions of
Dessein [4], who has shown that full delegation dominates veto-based delegation, and
Marino [11], who presents a model in which the opposite is true.
Certainly, the principal who has absolute commitment power could implement a
desired outcome through mechanisms other than veto-based delegation such as direct
message mechanisms and constrained delegation. Section 8 discusses advantages and
disadvantages of veto-based delegation over these alternative mechanisms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an example.
Section 3 introduces the model. Sections 4 and 5 derive the main results. Section
3In a similar model Melumad and Shibano [13] show that a subset of optimal incentive-compatible
outcomes can be implemented under a form of veto-based delegation. Proposition 2 generalizes their
result to other specifications of payoffs and distributions of private information, and to all incentive-
compatible allocations rather than a subset of optimal allocations.
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6 characterizes the efficient incentive-compatible outcomes, presents a comparative
statics result about the default decision, and analyzes the optimal amount of ex-
post discretion. In Section 7, I compare my results with the analysis of veto-based
delegation and full delegation in Dessein [4]. Section 8 concludes.
2 An Example
There is a principal (she) who must take a decision p ∈ R and an agent (he) who
has private information ω (his type) drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
The payoff of the principal is u(p, ω) = −(p − ω)2, that of the agent is ua(p, ω) =
−(p− (ω + b))2, where b > 0 is the bias of the agent. This is the setting of the main
example in Crawford and Sobel [3] which has been used extensively in the literature
on communication and delegation.
Holmstro¨m [8] points out that in this environment every feasible outcome can be
viewed as an equilibrium of constrained delegation, where the agent is allowed to
choose freely from a specified set of lotteries over decisions. This result is a twin
of the Revelation Principle for the one-agent case. Consider an arbitrary game: In
equilibrium, the actions of the agent result in a lottery over the final decisions. Instead
of playing this game, one can ask the agent to pick a lottery directly by allowing him to
choose from the set of lotteries present on the equilibrium path of the original game.
Thus, without loss of generality we can concentrate on the games of constrained
delegation.
Our goal is to see which outcomes of constrained delegation can be replicated
through veto-based delegation. In this game, the principal selects the default decision,
p0, the agent makes a proposal p, and, finally, the principal either approves or vetoes
it. In the case of a veto, the default p0 is implemented. The solution concept is the
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
The difference between constrained delegation and veto-based delegation lies in the
amount of commitment power given to the principal. Under constrained delegation
the principal commits to approving some proposals and prohibiting others regardless
of the information she infers from the agent’s behavior. In contrast, under veto-
based delegation, the principal should optimally make her approval decision given
her updated beliefs.
Consider a case of constrained delegation whereby the agent is allowed to choose
from P = [0, 1− b]. Because the agent’s payoff function is a quadratic loss function in
the difference between his most preferred alternative pIa = ω+ b and the actual choice
p, the agent will select the alternative from P that is the closest to pIa. In Figure 1
the bold line represents the outcome of the agent’s decision problem. He chooses his
most preferred alternative if ω ∈ [0, 1− b] and p = p0 = 1− b otherwise.
To replicate this outcome through veto-based delegation, set the default decision
to p0 = 1 − b. There follows an equilibrium in which the agent proposes p = ω + b
for ω ∈ [0, 1 − b] and 1 − b otherwise, and the principal approves any proposal on
the equilibrium path, p ≤ 1 − b. She vetoes any proposal off the equilibrium path,
p > 1− b, which leads to the default decision p0 = 1− b.
4
-6
ω
p
0
b
1− b
Figure 1: Constrained delegation with P = [0, 1− b]. The horizontal axis represents ω and
the vertical axis represents p. The agent’s bias is b > 0, ω is uniform on [0, 1]. The ideal
decisions for the principal and the agent are correspondingly pI = ω and pIa = ω + b. The
bold curve represents the equilibrium outcome: the agent chooses the alternative closest to
his ideal.
On the equilibrium path, the principal infers ω when p ∈ [b, 1− b[. She approves
the proposal because the positive bias of the agent implies that the proposed decision
p is better than the default decision p0. Off the equilibrium path, the principal’s veto
is optimal if, for example, she believes that ω = 1− b, in which case p0 = 1− b is her
ideal. The agent’s behavior is optimal since he has effectively the same choices as in
the original problem.
Thus, by setting p0 equal to the highest decision taken on the equilibrium path
under constrained delegation, the principal can replicate its outcome through veto-
based delegation. In fact, for these specific preferences of the principal and the agent,
a similar construction can be applied to any feasible outcome.
However, there are situations in which outcomes of constrained delegation cannot
be achieved through veto-based delegation. For instance, assume that u(p, ω) =
−(p − ω)2 and ua(p, ω) = −(p − (ω/2 + 1/4))2 and allow the agent to choose any
alternative from P = [1/3, 2/3], see Figure 2. (The principal will never actually select
this mechanism; still, this example aids in illustrating why veto-based delegation may
be unable to reproduce some outcomes.) In this case, the agent will always choose
his most preferred alternative p = ω/2 + 1/4 for ω ∈ [1/6, 5/6], p = 1/6 for ω < 1/6
and p = 2/3 otherwise. It is impossible to find a default decision p0 that allows
replicating this outcome through veto-based delegation. Even if the agent follows
the same strategy, when p0 ∈ [1/3, 2/3] the principal will find it optimal to intervene
and veto some of the proposals on the equilibrium path. On the other hand, if
p0 ∈] −∞, 1/3[∩[2/3,+∞[, the agent will find it optimal to propose an alternative
outside of P regardless of whether the principal will veto it. In either case, the original
outcome cannot be achieved. Proposition 2 in Section 5 describes necessary and
sufficient conditions under which any feasible outcome can be implemented through
veto-based delegation.
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Figure 2: Constrained delegation with P = [1/3, 2/3]. The horizontal axis represents ω and
the vertical axis represents p. The agent’s type ω is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The ideal
decisions for the principal and the agent are correspondingly pI = ω and pIa = ω/2 + 1/4.
The bold curve represents the equilibrium outcome: the agent chooses the alternative closest
to his ideal.
3 The Model
There is a principal (she) and an agent (he). The agent has one-dimensional private
information ω ∈ R, called a state of the world or a type of the agent. The principal’s
prior beliefs about ω are represented by a probability measure µω(·) with a convex
support Ω (notice that this allows for mass points, but not discrete support). The
principal holds the rights over a convex set of possible decisions P ⊆ R. The payoffs
of the principal and the agent are u(p, ω) and ua(p, ω), where p is the decision taken.
Both u(·, ω) and ua(·, ω) are symmetric unimodal functions: they achieve their unique
global maximums correspondingly at p = pI(ω) and p = pIa(ω) and strictly decrease
as p moves away from pI and pIa.
4 The functions pI(·) and pIa(·), pI(·) 6= pIa(·) are
continuous, bounded, non-decreasing, and satisfy µ(Ωω) = 0 for ω = {ω′|pIa(ω′) =
pIa(ω)}, i.e., the probability of the states in which the most preferred decisions for the
agent coincide is zero. Finally, pI(·) is such that P = {p|pI(ω) = p, ω ∈ Ω}.5
As discussed in Section 2 (see also Holmstro¨m [8] and Alonso and Matouschek
[1]), due to the fact that in any game the agent is always free to choose any behavior
regardless of his type, the knowledge of the final decisions taken on the equilibrium
path is sufficient to characterize the equilibrium outcome; the specific content of the
actions available to the agent is irrelevant. Therefore, a mechanism (with perfect
4A unimodal function can be viewed as a parametrization of a strictly quasiconcave monotonic
utility function defined on a two dimensional space (e.g., quasilinear preferences) whereby choices are
subject to a budget constraint. Unimodality is somewhat stronger than single-peaked preferences
because it rules out indifference among decisions. Also, the assumption of symmetry of the payoffs
is standard in the literature. It is convenient for our analysis but the results can be modified to
account for asymmetric cases.
5This is also a standard (implicit) assumption in the literature. Even if it does not hold, one can
redefine the set of feasible decisions as P′ = P ∩ {p|p = pI(ω)}. The only outcomes that may be
potentially lost are strictly suboptimal from the principal’s perspective.
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commitment) is a set P ⊆ P.6 It induces a decision problem in which the agent
receives his private information ω and chooses a decision p ∈ P to maximize his
payoff. A mechanism is ex-ante incentive-efficient if it generates a Pareto efficient pair
of the ex-ante payoffs (i.e., there is no mechanism that yields higher expected payoffs
to the principal and the agent).7 It is assumed that the agent always participates in
a mechanism.8
I also consider mechanisms in which the principal cannot ex-ante commit to a set
of allowed decisions. Instead, after observing the agent’s decision, the principal can
intervene and change it. What the principal can commit to is the set of decisions
available to her when overruling the agent’s choice. Hence, a mechanism with im-
perfect commitment is a restricted set P0 ⊆ P. It induces a game between the agent
and the principal in which the agent proposes a decision p ∈ P, and the principal
either approves it or overrules it with a decision from P0.9 The solution concept for
this game is the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. That is, the agent’s proposal and the
principal’s decision must be optimal given their beliefs, which, in turn, are required
to be Bayesian whenever possible.
This definition of mechanism allows for communication, veto-based delegation,
and full delegation, among other games. Under communication, the principal is free
to make any decision after the agent’s proposal, which is equivalent to P0 = P. Under
full delegation, the principal commits not to reverse the agent’s decisions, which is
equivalent to P0 = ∅. Finally, under veto-based delegation, if the agent’s proposal is
vetoed, then a fixed default decision p0 is implemented. Here, the restricted decision
set P0 = {p0} is a singleton.
An outcome is said to be implemented through veto-based delegation if there is some
game of veto-based delegation in which this outcome is an equilibrium. The following
two sections describe the conditions under which a given outcome can be implemented
through veto-based delegation, but not necessarily as a unique equilibrium.
4 Imperfect Commitment
This section generalizes the observation that an outcome of communication can be
implemented through veto-based delegation. Consider an arbitrary mechanism with
imperfect commitment. Unless it is full delegation, in the equilibrium of this mech-
anism the principal chooses p′ ∈ P0 following some (possibly, out-of-equilibrium)
proposal by the agent. The outcome of this mechanism can be implemented through
veto-based delegation. In order to do so, set p0 = p
′ and construct the equilibrium
strategies by modifying the strategies in the original game as follows: If in the original
6Following the literature we consider only deterministic mechanisms. This may potentially con-
tain some loss of generality since stochastic mechanisms may outperform deterministic.
7This concept of efficiency is defined in Holmstro¨m and Myerson [9].
8Alternatively, one can impose assumptions on the preferences such that efficient mechanisms
generate a higher payoff for the agent than the decision the principal would take based solely on her
prior beliefs.
9This is not the most general specification of a mechanism with imperfect commitment. See Bester
and Strausz [2], who study the validity of the Revelation Principle under imperfect commitment.
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game the agent’s proposal was rejected, have the agent propose p ∈ P0, which was
implemented instead of his proposal. Otherwise, his strategy is the same as before.
The principal’s strategy is to reject any proposal rejected in the original game and
approve everything else. Finally, when an off-the-equilibrium-path proposal is vetoed,
endow the principal with the belief that ω = ω′, where p0 = pI(ω′); otherwise let her
have the same beliefs as in the original game.
Certainly, if these strategies and beliefs are equilibrium then the outcomes are
the same in both games. It is immediately clear that the principal’s behavior off the
equilibrium path is optimal given her beliefs. It is also easy to see the optimality of
approving any proposal on the equilibrium path. First, after observing p /∈ P0, the
principal’s beliefs are the same as in the original game and since it was optimal to
approve the proposal before, it must be optimal to do so now. Second, for p ∈ P0, it
must be that in the original game the agent’s proposal was either p, in which case it
was approved, or p∗ 6= p, in which case it was vetoed with p. It follows that for all ω
that lead to p, the principal prefers p to p0.
The agent’s behavior is also optimal. Under veto-based delegation the agent
achieves the same outcome as in the original game, while any deviation available
to him now was also present in the original game. Therefore, the optimality of his
original behavior implies that he does not have a profitable deviation.
We have
Proposition 1. Any outcome of any mechanism with imperfect commitment, with
the exception of full delegation, can be implemented through veto-based delegation.
Proof. Let pA(·) and dV (·) be the equilibrium strategies under imperfect commitment
and PA = {p|p = dV (pA(ω))} be the set of implemented decisions. Choose any p′ (it
exists) such that p′ = dV (p) for some p and set p0 = p′. In the game of veto-based
delegation define the strategies of the players by pa(ω) = dV (pA(ω)) and
dv(p) =
{
p, p ∈ PA;
p0, otherwise.
These strategies replicate the original outcome. For proposals off the equilibrium
path, p /∈ PA, set the principal belief to be any ω such that p0 = pI(ω).
These strategies and beliefs are PBE. Consider the agent. Any deviation to p ∈
PA, p 6= pa(ω) was available in the original game and therefore cannot be profitable.
Any deviation to p /∈ P f results in p0; it was also available before and hence is not
profitable. For the principal, vetoing any p /∈ PA is optimal due to the manner
of construction of the out-of-equilibrium beliefs. It is optimal to approve proposals
p ∈ PA, since it was optimal to implement this decision rather than p0 in the original
game.
In particular,
Corollary 1. Any outcome of communication can be implemented through veto-based
delegation.
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Remark: full delegation. One can trivially implement full delegation through
veto-based delegation by choosing the default decision such that the principal will
never use it - if it is possible to find such a decision. Strictly speaking, under the
assumption of our model that for any p ∈ P there exists ω ∈ Ω such that p = pI(ω),
such implementation might be difficult. One can show that veto-based delegation
can implement full delegation if and only if there exists ω0 such that (1) the most
preferred decisions of the agent and the principal coincide pIa(ω0) = p
I(ω0), (2) if
pIa(ω) ≥ pI(ω0) then pI(ω) ≥ (pI(ω0) + pI(ω))/2, and (3) if pIa(ω) ≤ pI(ω0) then
pI(ω) ≤ (pI(ω0) + pI(ω))/2.
5 Perfect Commitment: The Veto-Power
Principle
The previous section has shown that the principal can reproduce outcomes of mecha-
nisms with imperfect commitment through veto-based delegation by asking the agent
to propose the alternatives chosen in the original mechanism and promising to veto
any deviations. The difficulty that arises if one attempts to adapt this result to the
cases with perfect commitment is that the principal might be willing to veto some
decisions that appear on the equilibrium path in the original mechanism. This is not
an issue under imperfect commitment because in those games, by construction, every
decision taken on the equilibrium path is optimal given the principal’s beliefs. In con-
trast, if the principal has perfect commitment, she can, in fact, commit not to overrule
some of the decisions. This section is devoted to characterizing the conditions under
which any outcome induced by an arbitrary mechanism without monetary transfers
can be implemented through veto-based delegation.
As shown in an example in Section 2, a sufficient condition that allows implement-
ing a large range of incentive-compatible outcomes through veto-based delegation is
that the agent is always (weakly) biased in the same direction, i.e., pI(·) and pIa(·) do
not intersect. At the same time, the example in Figure 2 points to a condition under
which there are outcomes that cannot be implemented through veto-based delegation:
the agent is biased towards higher decisions for low ideal decisions of the principal,
but becomes more conservative and prefers lower decisions when the principal’s ideal
decisions are high. I call preferences for which this condition does not hold regular.
Definition 1. The preferences are called regular if there do not exist ω−, ω+ ∈ Ω,
ω− < ω+ such that pIa(ω
−)− pI(ω−) > 0 > pIa(ω+)− pI(ω+).
The following proposition generalizes examples in Section 2 by showing that any
incentive-compatible outcome can be implemented through veto-based delegation if
and only if the preferences are regular. The proof proceeds along the lines of the
arguments in Section 2. The most tedious part is to demonstrate the optimality of
approving the agent’s proposals for the principal, when the agent is biased towards
lower decisions for small ω and towards higher decisions for high ω. It is done by
showing that if for low (resp. high) default decisions the principal is tempted to
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overrule some of the proposals that should be accepted, she will find it optimal to
approve all equilibrium proposals given some high (resp. low) default decision.
Proposition 2. (Veto-Power Principle) Any outcome of any mechanism with
perfect commitment can be implemented through veto-based delegation if and only if
preferences are regular.
Proof. Sufficiency. Fix an outcome described by f : Ω → P with a (compact) set
of taken decisions P f = {f(ω)|ω ∈ Ω}. In a game of veto-based delegation with
p0 ∈ {supP f , inf P f}, define the strategies of the players by pa(ω) = f(ω) and
dv(p) =
{
p, p ∈ P f ;
p0, otherwise.
Clearly, these strategies replicate the original outcome. For proposals off the equilib-
rium path, p /∈ P f , set the principal belief to be any ω such that p0 = pI(ω).
With a proper choice of p0 these strategies and beliefs become PBE. Consider the
agent. Any deviation to p′ ∈ P f , p′ 6= f(ω) was available in the original mechanism
and therefore cannot be profitable. Any deviation to p′ /∈ P f results in p0. Since p0
is either supremum or infinum (or maximum or minimum) of P f , this deviation also
cannot be profitable. For the principal, vetoing any p /∈ P f is optimal by the manner
of construction of the out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Showing the optimality of approving proposals on the equilibrium path is some-
what more involved. If for all ω, pI(ω) − pIa(ω) ≤ 0, set p0 = supP f . There are two
possibilities. First, when pI(ω) ≤ p ≤ p0, the optimality of approval is immediate.
Second, if p < pI(ω) then the optimality of the agent’s strategy and the symmetry
of his payoff implies pIa(ω) − p ≤ p0 − pIa(ω). Therefore pI(ω) − p ≤ p0 − pI(ω),
which makes approval optimal. Similarly, the symmetric case is where for all ω,
pI(ω)− pIa(ω) ≥ 0 and p0 = inf P f .
Now consider the case in which pI(ω)−pIa(ω) varies its sign. First, consider the case
in which P f is convex. Denote by ω∗ the state at which pI(ω∗) − pIa(ω∗) = 0. The
regularity of preferences implies that this state is unique, and that pIa(ω) ≥ pI(ω)
for ω ≥ ω∗ and pIa(ω) ≤ pI(ω) otherwise. Let ω− satisfy pIa(ω−) = inf P f and
p− = pI(ω−). Similarly, let ω+ satisfy pIa(ω
+) = supP f and p+ = pI(ω+). Finally,
denote p∗ = (supP f + inf P f )/2 and set
p0 =
{
supP f , pI(ω∗) ≤ p∗;
inf P f , otherwise.
Assume pI(ω∗) ≤ p∗. For all ω ≥ ω∗, the equilibrium proposal satisfies p ∈ [pI(ω), p0]
and therefore p0 − pI(ω) ≥ p − pI(ω) which makes approval optimal. For ω ≤ ω∗,
approving the proposal is optimal if pI(ω) − (p + p0)/2 ≤ 0. The left hand side of
this inequality achieves its supremum either at ω− or ω∗. Thus, the proposal should
be approved since pI(ω−)− (pIa(ω−) + p0)/2 ≤ pI(ω∗)− p∗ ≤ 0.
Consider now the case in which P f is not convex. That is, there are one or more
intervals (p1, p2), minP
f ≤ p1 < p2 ≤ maxP f , excluded from P f . If pI(ω∗) ≤ p1 or
p2 ≤ pI(ω∗), nothing changes in the preceeding argument. Assume now that p1 <
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pI(ω∗) < p2. It is easy to see that p2 ∈ [pI(ω), p0] and hence it should be approved.
Let ω′ be defined by pIa(ω
′)− p1 = p2− pIa(ω′). Proposal p1 will clearly be approved if
for all ω such that pa(ω) = p1, p
I(ω) ≤ (p2+p0)/2. The left hand side of this inequality
achieves its maximum at ω′. If ω′ ≥ ω∗, then pI(ω′) ≤ pIa(ω′) = (p1 + p2)/2 ≤ (p0 +
p2)/2. Otherwise, ω
′ ≤ ω∗ and pI(ω′) ≤ pI(ω∗) ≤ p∗ = (p0+minP f )/2 ≤ (p0+p2)/2.
The proof for pI(ω∗) ≥ p∗ is completely analogous.
Necessity. If preferences are not regular, then there exist ω−, ω+, ω− < ω+ such
that pI(ω−) < pIa(ω
−) and pI(ω+) > pIa(ω
+). Consider an outcome
f(ω) =

pIa(ω
−), ω ≤ ω−;
pIa(ω), ω
− < ω < ω+;
pIa(ω
+), ω+ ≤ ω.
This outcome is incentive-compatible but cannot be implemented through veto-based
delegation. In such a game, the agent would have to propose p = pIa(ω) for ω ∈
]ω−, ω+[ which would allow the principal to infer ω. If p0 = minP f = pIa(ω
−) or
p0 = maxP
f = pIa(ω
+), the principal would veto the proposals close to either pIa(ω
−)
or pIa(ω
+). It is easy to see that no other decision could be used as a default. Either
the default will not pose enough of a threat to the agent or the principal will find it
profitable to veto some p ∈ P f to achieve her ideal decision.
This proposition does not imply that if the preferences are not regular, veto-based
delegation cannot implement optimal outcomes, but rather that there will be some
outcomes that could not be implemented. As evident in the example in Figure 2, such
outcomes may be suboptimal. In fact, there, the optimal choice for the principal is
to fully delegate decision-making to the agent. In that example, the outcome of full
delegation can be implemented through veto-based delegation by setting p0 = 1/2.
Certainly, if preferences are regular, then the optimal outcome can be implemented
through veto-based delegation.
Corollary 2. If preferences are regular, the outcome of the mechanism with perfect
commitment that yields the highest payoff to the principal can be implemented through
veto-based delegation.
Another immediate consequence of this proposition follows from the fact that
regularity of preferences and continuity of pI(ω) and pIa(ω) imply that these functions
intersect at most once.
Corollary 3. If pI(ω) and pIa(ω) intersect more than once, there are mechanisms
whose outcomes cannot be implemented through veto-based delegation.
In special cases the condition on preferences can be formulated in a somewhat
simpler form. Often, the literature has studied quadratic payoffs with ideal decisions
linear in ω. Therefore, I present
Corollary 4. If pI(ω) = ap+bpω, bp > 0, and p
I
a(ω) = aa+baω, ba > 0, any outcome
of any mechanism can be implemented through veto-based delegation if and only if
either pIa(ω) and p
I(ω) never intersect or bp < ba.
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As can be seen in the example from Section 2, sometimes the decision that the
principal has to set as a default is rather extreme. This is due to the fact that for
moderate default decisions the principal will be tempted to overrule some proposals
of the agent that need to be approved. Let p and p denote the lowest and the highest
decisions that occur in some incentive-compatible outcome.
Proposition 3. If an outcome can be implemented through veto-based delegation,
then it can also be implemented through veto-based delegation with p0 ∈ {p, p}. There
exist outcomes which can only be implemented through veto-based delegation with p0 ∈
{p, p}.
Proof. The first part of the proposition has already been established in the proof
of Proposition 2. The example given in Section 2 proves the second statement. In
that example, the mechanism P = [0, 1− b] can be implemented through veto-based
delegation if and only if p0 = 1 − b. If p0 > 1 − b the agent will deviate and offer
p = p0 for ω = p0 − b. If p0 < 1 − b, the principal will veto the proposals around
p = p0 + b.
Although it is useful to know when any outcome can be implemented through veto-
based delegation, a more pragmatic approach would be to characterize the conditions
under which a given outcome can be implemented in this way. In general these
conditions will depend on the precise functional form of prior beliefs and payoffs.
However, one sufficient condition is that the implemented decision is always weakly
bigger (or always weakly smaller) than the ideal decision of the principal.
Proposition 4. An outcome f(ω1) can be implemented through veto-based delegation
if (1) for all ω pI(ω)− f(ω) ≤ 0 or (2) for all ω pI(ω)− f(ω) ≥ 0.
Proof. Set p0 = supP , if for all ω pI(ω) − f(ω) ≤ 0, and p0 = inf P otherwise, and
repeat the first part of the proof of sufficiency in Proposition 2.
The above results are obtained for deterministic mechanisms. In general, the Veto-
Power Principle will not hold for mechanisms with perfect commitment that allow
lotteries over decisions. After observing an agent’s proposal, a risk-averse principal,
for instance, will prefer to select a unique alternative rather than choose randomly
among several of them.
Finally, the assumptions that pI(·) and pIa(·) are bounded, continuous, and mono-
tone or that Ω is convex are not crucial for the results in this and the previous
sections. Even the assumption of the symmetry of the payoffs can be somewhat re-
laxed at the cost of complicating the regularity condition. However, without these
assumptions it will be more difficult to characterize the necessary condition for the
result in Proposition 2.
6 Optimal Amount of Ex-post Discretion
In this section I characterize the optimal amount of ex-post discretion P0 in the
mechanisms with imperfect commitment. In order to do so, I first describe the set
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of ex-ante incentive-efficient mechanisms and then show that their outcomes can be
implemented under imperfect commitment only if P0 does not contain any decisions
taken on the equilibrium path except the most extreme decision.
To make the analysis tractable I impose more structure on preferences and prior
beliefs. It is assumed that ω is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], pI(ω) = ω, and
pIa(ω) = b+ω, b > 0. In addition, u(p, ω) = u(p−ω) and ua(p, ω) = ua(p−ω− b) are
strictly concave and symmetric around 0. I also restrict the set of possible decisions
to be P = [b, 1].
Remark. Holmstro¨m [10] and Melumad and Shibano [15] have obtained the char-
acterization of the optimal mechanism for the principal for a slightly more special
case where the payoffs are quadratic and ω is distributed uniformly. Alonso and
Matouschek [1] analyze the optimal delegation mechanism for continuous distribu-
tions of private information, single peaked payoff function of the agent, and a general
quadratic payoff function of the principal. Martimort and Semenov [14] derive a
condition on the prior beliefs for the optimal mechanism to be convex for the case
of quadratic payoffs. Holmostro¨m mentions, without proof, that his result can be
extended to more general payoff functions. It turns out that to do so one would have
to make some additional assumptions similar to restricting the set of decisions to
P = [b, 1].
Under our assumptions, the efficient mechanisms take a simple form, PO = [b, p],
p ≥ 1−b: the principal allows the agent to choose freely among moderate alternatives
and prohibits all extreme decisions.10 In particular, the optimal mechanism for the
agent has p = 1 and the optimal mechanism for the principal has p = 1 − b. The
efficient mechanisms are convex because an exclusion of an interior set does not change
the average decision taken in equilibrium but increases its variance, thus, hurting both
parties. (This is exactly the reason why in Dessein [7] full delegation is often better
than communication.)
Compare two mechanisms such that one of them has [a1, a2] ∈ P1 and the other
has]a1, a2[/∈ P2, a1, a2 ∈ P2 (see, for example, Figures 1 and 3). In the first mechanism,
the agent will choose ω + b for ω ∈ [a1 − b, a2 − b], while in the second he will choose
a1 for ω ∈ [a1 − b, (a1 + a2)/2− b[ and a2 for ω ∈](a1 + a2)/2− b, a2 − b]. Due to the
uniformity of distribution of ω the average realized decision and, therefore, the average
distance between the ideal and the actual decision is the same in both mechanisms
for either of the players. However, the variance of the realized decision is zero in
the first mechanism and is strictly positive in the second mechanism. Therefore, the
principal and the agent must be strictly worse off in the second mechanism due to
strict concavity of their payoffs. This implies that the efficient mechanism should
take the form PO = [p, p].
Next, notice that the principal and the agent never want to exclude low decisions.
If the lowest allowed decision p exceeds b then for ω ∈ [0, p− b] the agent must choose
p, whereas both the agent and the principal would have been better off with a decision
10Without the restriction that P = [b, 1], a principal who is not too risk-averse could benefit from
excluding a set of decisions around b since it would decrease the average realized distance between
the taken decision and her most preferred decision at the cost of additional variance. In this case,
some efficient mechanisms could be of the form PO = {p1} ∪ [p, p].
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a2
Figure 3: Constrained delegation with P = {a1}∪ [a2, a3]. The horizontal axis represents ω
and the vertical axis represents p. The agent’s bias is b > 0, ω is uniform on [0, 1]. The ideal
decisions for the principal and the agent are correspondingly pI = ω and pIa = ω + b. The
bold curve represents the equilibrium outcome: the agent chooses the alternative closest to
his ideal.
of ω + b. Hence, the optimal mechanism must have PO = [b, p].
Finally, let the mechanism be P = [b, p]. In this case, the agent will choose
p = ω+ b for ω ∈ [0, p− b] and p otherwise. The principal obtains the decision which
is b away from her most preferred decision for ω ∈ [0, p − b] and the decision that is
|p−ω| away from her most preferred decision otherwise. Because of uniformity of the
distribution of ω, the principal’s payoff is maximized when p = 1− b (see the proof of
Lemma 1 for details). At the same time, the agent’s payoff increases in p since higher
values enable him to obtain decisions closer to his ideal. This allows us to conclude
that every efficient mechanism must have p ≥ 1− b. Therefore,
Lemma 1. The set of efficient mechanisms is PE = {[b, p]|p ≥ 1 − b}. The highest
payoff for the principal is achieved by PP = [b, 1 − b] and the highest payoff for the
agent is achieved by PA = [b, 1].
Proof. Let P1 and P2 be mechanisms that differ only in that ]a1, a2[∈ P1 and ]a1, a2[/∈
P2, where a1, a2 ∈ P1,P2. Then, the parties can achieve different payoffs in these two
mechanisms only for ω ∈ Ω∗ =]a1− b, a2− b[. For all of these states, in equilibrium of
P1, the agent will select p = ω+b. In equilibrium of P2, however, the agent will select
p = a1 for ω ∈ Ω∗− =]a1 − b, (a1 + a2)/2− b[ and p = a2 for ω ∈ Ω∗+ =](a1 + a2)/2−
b, a2 − b[. Therefore, conditional on Ω∗ in these mechanisms the expected payoffs
of the principal are U(P1|Ω∗) = u(b) and U(P2|Ω∗) = (U(P2|Ω∗−) + U(P2|Ω∗+))/2 =(∫
Ω∗−
u(a1 − ω)dω +
∫
Ω∗+
u(a2 − ω)dω
)
/2 < u(b). Similarly, the expected payoffs of
the agent are Ua(P1|Ω∗) = u(0) and Ua(P2|Ω∗) = (Ua(P2|Ω∗−) + Ua(P2|Ω∗+))/2 =(∫
Ω∗−
ua(a1 − ω − b)dω +
∫
Ω∗+
ua(a2 − ω − b)dω
)
/2 < u(b). This implies that any ex-
ante efficient mechanism must be convex.
Next, let us show that the lowest decision in any efficient mechanism is p
O
= b.
The alternative would be to have p
O
> b. For ω ∈ [0, p− b[, the agent would choose
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p = ω in the former case and p = p
O
in the latter. Since p = ω is closer to the most
preferred decisions of both parties, and for all other ω the chosen decision is the same
in both mechanisms, it must be that p
O
= b.
It is left to prove that the highest decision in any efficient mechanism is pO ≥ 1−b.
Since the efficient mechanism is convex and p
O
= b, in any such mechanism the
decisions taken by the agent are
d(m(ω)) =
{
ω + b, ω < pO − b;
pO, otherwise.
For a given pO the expected payoff for the agent is Ua(pO) = ua(0)(pO − b) +∫ 1−pO+b
0
ua(ω)dω, which increases in p. The expected payoff for the principal is
U(pO) =
{
u(b)(pO − b) + 2
∫ 1
1−b u(ω)dω +
∫ 1−pO−b
0
u(b+ ω)dω, pO ≤ 1− b;
u(b)(pO − b) +
∫ b
0
u(ω)dω +
∫ 1−pO
0
u(ω)dω, otherwise.
It achieves its maximum at pO = 1 − b and decreases afterwards. Therefore, the
highest payoff for the principal is achieved by PP = [b, 1 − b], the highest payoff for
the agent by PA = [b, 1], and the set of efficient mechanisms is PE.
Proposition 2 implies that outcomes of these mechanisms can be implemented
through veto-based delegation. I now show that these outcomes can be implemented
through other mechanisms with imperfect commitment if and only if, with the excep-
tion of one decision, the principal abandons the right to take decisions which appear
on the equilibrium path and instead relies completely on the proposals of the agent:
the set of decisions taken by the agent on the equilibrium path P = [b, p] and the
set of decisions available for the principal P0 must have one and only one decision in
common, the largest decision taken on the equilibrium path, p.11
To see this, consider an efficient mechanism with p < 1. Imagine that there
is p′ ∈ P0 ∩ P , p′ < p. Then the principal will use it to overrule proposals in
(p′−b,min{p, p′+b}) to correct for the agent’s bias. On the other hand, if P0∩P = ∅,
then there will be decisions taken that exceed p.
Proposition 5. An outcome of a mechanism P = [b, p], 1 > p ≥ 1 − b} can be
implemented through a mechanism with imperfect commitment if and only if P0 ∩
P = p. The mechanism PA = [b, 1] can be implemented through a mechanism with
imperfect commitment if and only if P0 = 1 or P0 = ∅.
Proof. Clearly, the outcome of P = [b, 1] could be implemented by full delegation
with P0 = ∅.
Next, in any equilibrium of a mechanism with P = [b, p] the agent chooses
p =
{
ω + b, ω < p− b;
p, otherwise.
11With the trivial exception of the outcome of full delegation, which can be implemented both
with P0 = p = 1 and P0 = ∅.
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and for p < p the principal’s expected payoff from decision p′ after a proposal p is
Eu(p′|p) = u(p′, p− b).
If there exists p0 ∈ P0 ∩ P , p0 6= p, then p0 < p. In this case, for any proposal
p ∈]p0, p0 + b],
Eu(p|p) = u(p, p− b) < u(p0, p− b) = Eu(p0|p).
Therefore, the principal is better off overruling all such p with p0, which would destroy
the desired outcome.
Now consider the case in which P0∩P = ∅, P0 6= ∅ and p < 1. The only possibility
to support the desired outcome in equilibrium is for the principal to overrule all
proposals p > p with some p0 ∈ P0. However, because in this case p < p0 ≤ 1, there
exists ², 0 < ² < p0 − p such that for ω ∈]p0 − b− ², p0 − b],
ua(p− ω − b) < ua(p0 − ω − b)
Hence, the agent is better off proposing some p > p that will be vetoed by p0 rather
than proposing p for all such ω, which would destroy the desired outcome.
Lemma 1 and Proposition 5 yield a comparative statics result:
Corollary 5. The default decision for which veto-based delegation implements the
optimal outcome for the principal, p0 = 1 − b, becomes more extreme as the bias of
the agent b becomes smaller.
For the setting with more general distribution of private information, non-constant
bias, and quadratic payoff of the principal, Propositions 3, 4, 5, and 6 in Alonso
and Matouschek [1] establish the conditions under which, similarly to the result in
Lemma 1, the optimal mechanisms for the principal take the form of a single interval.
Proposition 5 and Corollary 5 would extend to their environment under the condition
that the bias of the agent has a constant sign.
7 Veto-based Delegation vs. Full Delegation
Proposition 7 in Dessein [4] compares the relative performance of full delegation and
veto-based delegation for fixed default decisions p0 in settings where the agent has a
constant positive bias, ω is distributed uniformly and payoff functions are concave.
Let b(p0) = (1− p0)/3. His result can be restated as:
(i) If b ≤ b(p0), full delegation strictly dominates veto-based delegation;
(ii) If b > b(p0), veto-based delegation dominates full delegation if the principal is
not too risk-averse.
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This result is related to Proposition 5, which states that veto-based delegation is
the only mechanism with imperfect commitment that achieves the incentive-efficient
outcomes {[b, p]|1 > p ≥ 1− b}. In particular, this means that full delegation cannot
achieve the principal’s favorite outcome for any degree of risk-aversion, and is therefore
payoff-inferior to veto-based delegation.
More generally, one can show that for all p0 > 1− b the principal is strictly better
off under veto-based delegation than under full delegation: it pays to exclude high
decisions for any degree of risk-aversion of the principal.
Example. If p0 ≥ 1 − b, ω is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], pI(ω) = ω, pIa(ω) =
b + ω, b > 0, u(p, ω) = u(p − ω) and ua(p, ω) = ua(p − ω − b) are strictly concave
and symmetric around 0, and P = [b, 1], there is an equilibrium under veto-based
delegation that yields to the principal a strictly higher payoff than does full delegation.
Proof. Consider the following equilibrium under veto-based delegation (Part (ii)
of Lemma 4 in Dessein [4]). The agent proposes his ideal decision for ω ≤ p0 − b
and p0 otherwise. The principal approves everything below p0 and vetoes everything
above it. The principal’s beliefs are Bayesian for the proposals on the equilibrium
path and ω = p0 otherwise (notice that these beliefs satisfy the Strict Equilibrium
Dominance for p0 ≥ 1− b). The agent’s behavior is optimal given that the principal
vetoes anything above p0. The principal’s veto is optimal given her beliefs. Due to
the fact that the agent’s bias is positive, the principal cannot benefit from the veto
of any proposal off the equilibrium path. When p0 > 1 − b, this equilibrium yields
u(b)(p0−b)+
∫ b
0
u(ω)dω+
∫
1− p00u(ω)dω to the principal. On the other hand, under
full delegation the payoff is u(b). Clearly, veto-based delegation yields a higher payoff
than does full delegation.
8 Discussion: veto-based delegation vs. other mech-
anisms
Veto-based delegation is a commonly observed decision-making arrangement. In or-
ganizations, the decisions of employees often require approval of higher-level manage-
ment. In many legal institutions one of the decision-making parties has veto rights.
In this paper I argue that veto-based delegation is an attractive decision mechanism
because with a proper choice of the default decision it achieves the optimal separation
of decision initiation and decision control (Fama and Jensen [5]): the principal encour-
ages the agent to use his knowledge by delegating him formal rights to initiate and
implement decisions, while she prevents the agent from behaving opportunistically
by keeping the right to block his decision.
In addition to veto-based delegation, incentive-compatible outcomes can be im-
plemented by at least two other types of mechanisms: message mechanisms and
constrained delegation. In a message mechanism, the principal specifies a set of mes-
sages and a function that maps the message sent by the agent into a decision. Under
constrained delegation, the principal specifies the set of decisions from which the
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agent chooses a decision. Veto-based delegation can do as well as any of these mech-
anisms, but clearly it cannot achieve strictly more. Moreover, often (but not always)
these mechanisms implement the desired outcome as a unique equilibrium, whereas
veto-based delegation typically has several equilibria.12
One of the advantages of veto-based delegation over these alternative mechanisms
is its simplicity: veto-based delegation requires specifying only a default decision,
whereas the other mechanisms must specify all feasible decisions. The fact that
determining and describing the entire set of decisions can be prohibitively costly has
long been recognized: Justice White noted in his dissenting opinion in INS v. Ghadha,
462 U.S. 919, (1983) that without the legislative veto Congress would be:
faced with a Hobson’s choice: either to refrain from delegating the nec-
essary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with
the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the
entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its lawmaking
function to the Executive Branch and independent agencies.13
There could also be other reasons that favor veto-based delegation. For instance,
in case of constrained delegation the principal authorizes the agent to take decisions
on her behalf. In these situations the doctrine of apparent authority implies that
the principal might be bound by the actions of the agent even if they were not
authorized.14 In the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) v. Hydrolevel
Corp, 456 U.S., 556, (1982), a predisposed member of ASME issued an unofficial
opinion declaring a Hydrolevel’s product unsafe. The Hydrolevel’s competitor used
this opinion to discourage sales of the Hydrolevel’s product, which eventually put
Hydrolevel out of business. The Supreme Court found ASME liable on the principle
of apparent authority. After this incident, ASME had mandated that all its opinions
should be reviewed and approved by someone not involved in their preparation.
As mentioned above, one difficulty with veto-based delegation is that the freedom
in constructing beliefs off the equilibrium path creates multiplicity of equilibria. How-
ever, there is some evidence that in reality the principal and the agent may be able
to coordinate to play a specific equilibrium. For instance, Fisher [6], p. 289, presents
an example in which NASA and the US Congress document their expectations about
how the law appropriating funds for NASA should be carried out.
Finally, the results in this paper can also be viewed from a different perspective.
In many situations veto-based delegation is not an outcome of a careful mechanism
design but rather a myopic attempt of a principal to deal with an ever increasing
12There could be multiple equilibria in message mechanisms and in constrained delegation if in the
equilibrium implementing the intended outcome the agent is indifferent between several messages or
decisions.
13Quoted from Fisher [6]. The US Supreme Court concluded in INS v. Ghadha that legislative
veto is unconstitutional. The expedited congressional oversight procedures were later developed as
an alternative form of veto-based delegation not subject to this ruling.
14The principle of apparent authority states that the principal is liable for the acts of her agent
even if the agent does not have an authority to perform this action but appears to the third party
as if he were granted such authority by the principal.
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number of tasks: delegate to the agent and retain the right to block his decisions.
This paper suggests that when such delegation takes place its success will hinge on
the proper choice of the default decision.
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